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Considering a checkpoint and communication pattern, the rollback-dependency trackability (RDT)
property stipulates that there is no hidden dependency between local checkpoints. In other words,
if there is a dependency between two checkpoints due to a noncausal sequence of messages (Z-path),
then there exists a causal sequence of messages (C-path) that doubles the noncausal one and that
establishes the same dependency.
This paper introduces the notion of RDT-compliance. A property defined on Z-paths is RDT-
compliant if the causal doubling of Z-paths having this property is sufficient to ensure RDT. Based on
this notion, the paper provides examples of such properties. Moreover, these properties are visible, i.e.,
they can be tested on the fly. One of these properties is shown to be minimal with respect to visible and
RDT-compliant properties. In other words, this property defines a minimal visible set of Z-paths that
have to be doubled for the RDT property to be satisfied.
Then, a family of communication-induced checkpointing protocols that ensure on-the-fly RDT
properties is considered. Assuming processes take local checkpoints independently (called basic check-
points), protocols of this family direct them to take on-the-fly additional local checkpoints (called forced
checkpoints) in order that the resulting checkpoint and communication pattern satisfies the RDT prop-
erty. The second contribution of this paper is a new communication-induced checkpointing protocol
P . This protocol, based on a condition derived from the previous characterization, tracks a minimal
set of Z-paths and breaks those not perceived as being doubled. Finally, a set of communication-
induced checkpointing protocols are derived from P . Each of these derivations considers a particular
weakening of the general condition used by P . It is interesting to note that some of these deriva-
tions produce communication-induced checkpointing protocols that have already been proposed in the
literature. C° 2001 Academic Press
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1. INTRODUCTION
Context. Long running scientific applications and service providing applications use rollback-
recovery techniques to increase their fault tolerance and their availability. This is done by saving onto
stable storage the state of processes (i.e., local checkpoints) involved in the application; these savings
aim at reducing either the service-down time or the amount of lost work in case of a failure (e.g.,
software bug or hardware failure). The application can then resume from a consistent global checkpoint
that consists of a collection of local checkpoints, one for each process in which no one happens-before
another [3, 6].
Rollback-recovery involves major problems such as recovery line computation, garbage collection of
old checkpoints, and output commits. Recovery line computation consists in finding the consistent global
checkpoint closer to the end of the computation. Garbage collection allows one to discard all checkpoints
related to events that occurred before the last computed recovery line [18]. The output commit problem
arises when an application interacts with clients that cannot rollback. So, before sending an output to that
client, one has to be sure that the system will not require that client to rollback. Simple solutions to the
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previous problems can be achieved if one is able to efficiently calculate the maximum and the minimum
consistent global checkpoint that contains a given set of local checkpoints [19]. These solutions would
enlarge the set of distributed applications that can benefit from the rollback-recovery technique.
Two approaches have emerged in the past decade to cope with the problems related to rollback,
namely, checkpoint-based rollback-recovery and log-based rollback-recovery. The latter does not rely
only on checkpoints; it assumes processes of a distributed computation follow a piecewise deterministic
(PWD) model [13]. Under this model each process execution is divided into deterministic state intervals
separated by nondeterministic events and each nondeterministic event can be detected, logged, and
replayed. By using that model, efficient and decentralized solutions to garbage collection, recovery line
computation, and output commits have been given (see the survey [5]). Among them, optimistic log-
based rollback-recovery solutions are based on a transitive dependency vector that cumulates rollback
dependencies among state intervals [4, 8, 14].
Practically, very few applications satisfy perfect PWD behavior. This is due to the fact that some
nondeterministic event can be either nonreplayable or nondetectable. Examples of nonreplayable events
are the ones produced by system calls which depend on the resource system state at the time the system
call is issued (e.g., memory allocation request, socket creation, etc.). This might cause different behaviors
of a process between its prefailure and its post-failure execution. In this case, all the aforementioned
advantages disappear. It is then a matter of fact that in the real world the majority of applications
include processes whose executions do not follow perfect PWD. A process alternates PWD and non-
PWD execution segments. So, a great challenge is how to simulate, at a reasonable cost, a PWD behavior
in non-PWD segments.
Checkpoint-based rollback-recovery does not require processes to follow a PWD behavior. They
lie only on checkpoints. Without PWD, rollback-recovery is more complex due to the dependencies
established by application messages between checkpoints of distinct processes. Then, the problem of
studying properties of checkpoint-based rollback-recovery passes through the study of a checkpoint and
communication pattern of a distributed computation which consists of the set of local checkpoints of
that computation and a dependency relation on those checkpoints. In a pioneering work [11], Netzer
and Xu have shown that such dependencies are actually created by sequences of messages, called zigzag
paths. They have proved an important theorem stating that any set of local checkpoints can be extended
to obtain a consistent global checkpoint if and only if they are not pairwise related by a zigzag path. Two
categories of zigzag paths have been identified: causal and noncausal. A causal zigzag path (in short
C-path) is one in which the send event of each message of the sequence (but the first) is causally dependent
on the delivery event of the message that immediately precedes it in the sequence. A noncausal zigzag
path (in short Z-path) is one in which there exists at least a pair of successive messages, say m and m 0, of
the sequence in which the sending event of m 0 precedes the delivery event of m in the same checkpoint
interval. A checkpoint interval is the set of events between two successive local checkpoints in the
same process. Dependencies created by C-paths are on-the-fly trackable (e.g., by means of a transitive
dependency vector). On the contrary, Z-paths create hidden dependencies.
In a seminal paper [19], Wang has pointed out that if all the dependencies between local checkpoints
are on-the-fly trackable (i.e., nonhidden dependencies), Netzer and Xu’s theorem reduces to sets of
local checkpoints that are not pairwise related by causal paths. In particular, one can calculate very ef-
ficiently the minimum and the maximum consistent global checkpoints that contain a given set of local
checkpoints. This allows simple and distributed solutions to garbage collection, recovery line compu-
tation, and output commits using a checkpoint-based rollback-recovery technique to be developed. To
formalize this situation, Wang has defined the rollback-dependency trackability (RDT) property which
imposes some restriction on the checkpoint and communication pattern associated with a distributed
computation. A checkpoint and communication pattern satisfies the RDT property if all Z-paths occur-
ring in this pattern are doubled. A Z-path is causally doubled (in brief doubled) if the pair of checkpoints
related by that Z-path is also related by a C-path.
It is easy to show that PWD is actually a particular case of RDT. Indeed, logging a nondeterministic
event after a “physical” checkpoint corresponds to placing a logical checkpoint1 before delivering a
1 Taking a logical checkpoint means saving onto stable storage all the nondeterministic events between the delivery of a
message and its immediate previous physical checkpoint.
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message. In that case, no Z-path can ever be formed (i.e., all zigzag paths are causal) and then RDT
is ensured in the checkpoint and communication pattern. Hence RDT can be used to simulate PWD
during non-PWD segments of a process by taking additional checkpoints.
Previous Work. Since the RDT property has been introduced, several characterizations of this
property in terms of checkpoint and communication patterns have been proposed. One of these char-
acterizations was given by Wang in [19]. Called FDAS (Fixed Dependency After Send), it requires
that, in the checkpoint and communication pattern associated with the computation, “after the first
message-sending event in any interval, the transitive dependency vector remains unchanged until the
next checkpoint.” Other characterizations of the RDT have been obtained previously, although they have
not been presented as such, since this concept had not yet been identified. These include: Checkpoint-
Before-Receive, No-Receive-After-Send [12], and Fixed-Dependency-Interval [16]. Wang has shown
that they are based on properties weaker than FDAS.
These characterizations have revealed themselves to be important not only from a theoretical point
of view, but also from a practical one, when considering the task of maintaining the RDT property
on-the-fly and without adding control messages while letting processes take local checkpoints inde-
pendently. Protocols that achieve this goal direct processes to take additional forced checkpoints when
the RDT-characterization upon which they are based is about to be violated. Such protocols are called
communication-induced [5]. A survey of checkpointing models underlying these protocols can be found
in [10].
A communication-induced checkpointing protocol based on the FDAS characterization of the RDT
property has been proposed in [19]. This protocol directs a process to take a forced checkpoint as soon
as it receives a message bringing new information (with respect to its transitive dependency vector) if
it has already sent a message in the same checkpoint interval. Other communication-induced protocols,
based on the aforementioned weaker characterizations [12, 26], were previously proposed. All are less
efficient than the FDAS protocol.
Aim of the Paper. The starting point of this work lies in the observation that, when considering
the FDAS characterization, it suffices to break a subset of Z-paths (namely the subset of those who
are perceived as creating new dependencies) in order that RDT be satisfied (in other words, that all
remaining Z-paths be doubled). This observation raises the following new question: how will subsets
of Z-paths whose elimination (by forced checkpoints) will be sufficient to ensure that all remaining
Z-paths are doubled be determined? To address this question, this paper introduces the concept of an
RDT-compliant property [2]. Consider a property X defined on Z-paths. Z-paths satisfying this property
are called X -paths. Informally, X is an RDT-compliant property if every checkpoint and communication
pattern without nondoubled X -paths enjoys the RDT property. For example, the FDAS characterization
is based on a property called Prime (which will be formally defined in Section 3.3.4). So, FDAS can
be reformulated as Prime is RDT-compliant (i.e., “no nondoubled Prime-paths” implies RDT). In other
words, a characterization based on an RDT-compliant property allows only a subset of Z-paths to be
tested, instead of the complete set of Z-paths. As a consequence, the stronger is the property, the more
efficient is the characterization, in the sense that there will be fewer Z-paths to consider for potential
removal.
As previously pointed out, this contribution is important also from a practical point of view, when
considering the design of communication-induced checkpointing protocols. In fact, protocols based on
stronger properties will have to check smaller subsets of Z-paths for potential breaking. It is important
to note that, as the future of a distributed computation is not available, properties to consider are those
that rely only on information contained in the causal past of events upon which the property is evaluated
(the arrival of messages). Such properties will be called visible properties [2]. All previously known
RDT-compliant properties (No-Receive-After-Send, FDAS) are visible.
In turn, the concept of an RDT-compliant property raises two important new questions. One is
theoretical and the other more practical.
† The first question can be formulated as: Is it possible to find a minimal RDT-compliant and
visible property, i.e., one that cannot be implied by any other RDT-compliant and visible property?
This property would correspond to a minimal subset of Z-paths that must be tested for potential on-line
removal in order to ensure the RDT property.
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† The second question is: Given an RDT-compliant visible property X , is it possible to design a
communication-induced protocol that tracks Z-paths satisfying X and breaks only those not perceived
as doubled?
None of these questions has been addressed in previous works. For example, none of the previously
known communication-induced protocols attempts to detect whether Z-paths are doubled or not (as an
example, FDAS protocol breaks all Prime-paths, whether they are doubled or not). In this paper, these
two questions are addressed by fully exploiting the concept of causal doubling, sketched in [19], that is
basic to the RDT property.
The first contribution of the paper answers the first question by providing an RDT-compliant property
that is minimal among visible and RDT-compliant properties. This is done by introducing successive vis-
ible properties on more and more constrained Z-paths, namely, Z-paths of order two (CC- paths), Causal-
Message-Z-paths (CM-paths), Simple-Causal-Message-Z-paths (SCM-paths), Prime-Simple-Causal-
Message-Z-paths (PSCM-paths), and finally, Elementary-Prime-Simple-Causal-Message-Z-paths
(EPSCM-paths). The following results are then proved. (1) The EPSCM property is RDT-compliant
(so, it characterizes RDT).2 (2) The EPSCM property cannot be implied by any other RDT-compliant
and visible property (so this characterization is minimal).
The second contribution of the paper is the design of a new protocol (P) based on the previous
EPSCM-path subset. A family (FRDT ) of communication-induced checkpointing protocols ensur-
ing the RDT property is introduced. The FRDT family is based on the following basic assumptions.
(i) On-the-fly: no knowledge of the future of the computation is available; i.e., the usable knowledge of
the computation at a certain event cannot be more than the one included in the causal past of that event.
(ii) The computational model is fully asynchronous (no private information—such as clock speed—
about other processes is available and message transfer delays are arbitrary). The proposed protocol has
two advantages: (1) based on a minimal condition, it tracks a minimal subset of Z-paths for potential
on-line breaking, and (2) it attempts to detect whether such a Z-path is doubled or not; as a consequence
it is no longer necessary to break Z-paths that are perceived as doubled. These two features reduce the
set of Z-paths that have to be broken. It is also shown that P is optimal with respect to the size of data
structures.
Finally, a hierarchy of RDT-compliant properties and of corresponding communication-induced pro-
tocols is set down. This hierarchy contains previously known characterizations and protocols (e.g.,
FDAS), but also some that had not yet been proposed.
The paper consists of seven sections. Section 2 introduces checkpoints and the RDT property. Then,
Section 3 defines visible RDT-compliant properties. Section 4 presents a minimal characterization of
RDT. Then, Section 5 introduces theFRDT family of communication-induced checkpointing protocols.
The protocol P , its performance, and a hierarchy of properties and protocols are presented in Section
6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. CHECKPOINTS AND ROLLBACK-DEPENDENCY TRACKABILITY
2.1. Distributed Computations
A distributed computation consists of a finite set of n processes fP1; P2; : : : ; Png, connected by a
communication network, that communicate and synchronize only by exchanging messages through the
network. We assume that each ordered pair of processes is connected by an asynchronous directed logical
channel whose transmission delays are unpredictable. Each process runs on a processor. Processors do
not share either a common memory or a common clock value; there is no bound for their relative speeds.
A process can execute internal, send, and delivery statements. An internal statement does not involve
communication. When Pi executes the statement “send(m) to Pj ” it puts the message m into the channel
from Pi to Pj . When Pi executes the statement “deliver(m),” it is blocked until at least one message
directed to Pi has arrived; then a message is withdrawn from one of its input channels and delivered to
Pi . Executions of internal, send, and delivery statements are modeled by internal, sending, and delivery
events.
2 A preliminary version of this result has appeared in [2].
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Processes of a distributed computation are sequential, in other words, each process Pi produces a
sequence of events ei;1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ei;s ¢ ¢ ¢. This sequence can be finite or infinite, but the number of events
preceding each event is finite. Every process Pi has an initial local state denoted by ¾i;0. The local state
¾i;s (s > 0) results from the execution of the sequence ei;1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ei;s applied to the initial state ¾i;0. More
precisely, the event ei;s moves Pi from the local state ¾i;s¡1 to the local state ¾i;s . By definition we say
that “ei;x belongs to ¾ j;s” if i D j and x • s.
Let H be the set of all the events produced by a distributed computation. This computation is modeled
by the partially ordered set ˆH D (H; hb!), where hb! denotes Lamport’s well-known happened-before
relation defined in [6]:
ei;s
hb! e j;t ,
8><>:
j D i and t D s C 1
or ei;s D send(m) and e j;t D deliver(m)
or 9e : ei;s hb! e ^ e hb! e j;t :
Let us denote by l! the local precedence relation on events:
(ei;s l! e j;t ), (i D j and s • t):
Note that this relation is the reflexive closure of the “local restriction” of the happened-before relation.
In particular, we have:
((ei;s hb! e j;t ) ^ (i D j))) (ei;s l! e j;t )
((ei;s l! ei;t ) ^ (s 6D t))) (ei;s hb! ei;t ):
2.2. Local Checkpoints
A local checkpoint C is a recorded state of a process. A local state is not necessarily recorded as a
local checkpoint, so the set of local checkpoints is only a subset of the set of local states.
DEFINITION 2.1. A checkpoint and communication pattern is a pair ( ˆH ; C ˆH) where ˆH is a distributed
computation and C ˆH is a set of local checkpoints defined on ˆH .
Ci;x represents the x th local checkpoint of process Pi . The local checkpoint Ci;x corresponds to some
local state ¾i;s with x • s. Figure 1 shows an example of a checkpoint and communication pattern. We
assume that each process Pi takes an initial local checkpoint Ci;0 (corresponding to ¾i;0), and after each
event a checkpoint will eventually be taken.
2.3. Rollback-Dependency Trackability
This section first introduces the concepts of a Z-path, causal doubling of a Z-path, and rollback-
dependency trackability. The concepts of Z-path and of rollback-dependency trackability were explicitly
introduced in [11] and [19], respectively. The concept of causal doubling of a Z-path was suggested in
FIG. 1. A checkpoint and communication pattern.
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[19], but, to our knowledge, it has never been exploited in RDT-related problems or protocols. These
concepts are related to a given checkpoint and communication pattern. In other words, assertions such as
“„ is a Z-path” or “the Z-path„ is doubled” may hold in one checkpoint and communication pattern but
not in another. Similarly, RDT is a property attached to a checkpoint and communication pattern: some
patterns satisfy the RDT property, while others do not. In this section, a checkpoint and communication
pattern is implicitly assumed.
2.3.1. Zigzag Paths, C-Paths, and Z-Paths
The sequence of events occurring at Pi between Ci;x¡1 and Ci;x (x > 0) is called the checkpoint
interval and is denoted by Ii;x ; x is called the index of this checkpoint interval.
DEFINITION 2.2. A zigzag path is a sequence of messages [m1;m2; : : : ;mq ] (q ‚ 1) such that,
8fi; (1 • fi • q ¡ 1) 9k (1 • k • n); 9s; 9t (s; t > 0) with deliver(mfi) 2 Ik;s ^ send(mfiC1) 2
Ik;t ^ s • t .
To our knowledge this notion was introduced for the first time by Netzer and Xu in [11]. If a zigzag
path [m1; : : : ;mq ] is such that send(m1) 2 Ii;x and deliver(mq ) 2 I j;y we say that this zigzag path is
from Ii;x to I j;y .
In the checkpoint and communication pattern shown in Fig. 1, [m3;m2] is a zigzag path of length 2,
from Ik;1 to Ii;2; [m5;m4] and [m5;m6] are two zigzag paths of length 2, from Ii;3 to Ik;2.
Notation. The following notation will be used in the rest of the paper. In a path ‡ , the first (resp. the
last) message will be denoted by ‡:first (resp. ‡:last). The length of a path ‡ is the number of messages
forming ‡ and will be denoted by j‡ j.
DEFINITION 2.3. A zigzag path is causal if the delivery event of each message (but the last one) locally
precedes the send event of the next message in the sequence: such a zigzag path is called a C-path. A
Z-path is a noncausal zigzag path.3 This means a zigzag path is either a Z-path or a C-path.
A zigzag path made up of a single message is a C-path. As an example the zigzag paths [m3;m2] and
[m5;m4] depicted in Fig. 1 are Z-paths, while the zigzag path [m5;m6] is a C-path.
Every Z-path ‡ is composed of several (at least two) C-paths „1; : : : ; „k¡1; „k; : : : ; „p (p ‚ 2).
This will be denoted by ‡ D „1 † ¢ ¢ ¢ „k¡1 †„k † ¢ ¢ ¢ †„p († denotes the Z-concatenation
operator). The order of a Z-path is the number of C-path components (at least two). Two consecutive
C-paths „k¡1 and „k meet in a backward-interval defined as:
DEFINITION 2.4. A backward-interval in a Z-path „1 † ¢ ¢ ¢ †„k¡1 †„k † ¢ ¢ ¢ †„p (p ‚ 2) is an
interval I such that send(„k :first) occurs in I before deliver(„k¡1:last).
A Z-path of order p has p¡1 backward-intervals. As an example, Z-path [m3;m2] depicted in Fig. 1
has one backward-interval, namely I j;2 while the Z-path [m5;m4;m7] has two backward-intervals,
namely I j;2 and Ik;2.
Notations. If the concatenation of two C-paths „1 and „2 is a C-path, this will be denoted by
„1 –„2 (– denotes the C-concatenation operator). More generally,fl will denote any concatenation of
two zigzag paths (causal or not) producing a new zigzag path.
2.3.2. Causal Doubling
DEFINITION 2.5. A Z-path from Ii;x to I j;y is doubled if i D j ^ x • y or if there exists a C-path „
from Ii;x 0 to I j;y0 where x • x 0 and y0 • y.
In the checkpoint and communication pattern shown in Fig. 1, the Z-path [m5;m4] is doubled by
[m5;m6].
3 Note that here, differently from other papers, a zigzag path and a Z-path are different notions.
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FIG. 2. Successive embedded subsets of Z-paths.
2.3.3. Rollback-Dependency Trackability
Rollback-dependency trackability was introduced by Wang in [19]. It can be defined as follows4:
DEFINITION 2.6. A checkpoint and communication pattern satisfies the RDT property if and only if
all its Z-paths are doubled.
3. VISIBLE AND RDT-COMPLIANT PROPERTIES
This section addresses the following question: Given a checkpoint and communication pattern
( ˆH ; C ˆH), is it necessary to break every nondoubled Z-path to ensure that ( ˆH ; C ˆH) satisfies the RDT
property? This feature is formally expressed with the concept of RDT-compliant property. Then, in-
creasingly stronger visible RDT-compliant properties are defined. Moreover, from an operational point
of view, all these properties have to be tested on-the-fly. This is captured by the concept of visible
property.
3.1. The Notion of RDT-Compliance
Given a property X defined on Z-paths, with each checkpoint and communication pattern ( ˆH ; C ˆH) is
associated the set of Z-paths that satisfy X in this pattern. These Z-paths will be called X -paths. It is
important to note that an X -path is related to a particular checkpoint and communication pattern while
the property X itself is defined independent of a particular pattern.
DEFINITION 3.1. A property X defined on Z-paths is RDT-compliant if:
8( ˆH ; C ˆH) : (there is no non-doubled X -paths in ( ˆH ; C ˆH)) ( ˆH ; C ˆH) satisfies RDT).
The successive RDT-compliant properties that will be defined are based on the notions of simple
C-path, prime C-path, and elementary C-path. From these notions we obtain the successive embedded
subsets of Z-paths (Fig. 2): CC-paths, CM-paths, SCM-paths, PSCM-paths, and, finally, EPSCM-paths.
Roughly, the meaning of these subsets is the following. Each Z-path is a sequence of at least
two C-paths „1 †„2 † ¢ ¢ ¢ †„k (k ‚ 2) such that, 8‘ (1 • ‘ • k ¡ 1): send(„‘C1:first) l!
deliver(„‘:last) (Fig. 3). k is the order of the Z-path.
A CC-path is a Z-path composed of exactly two C-paths „1 † „2 (Z-path of order two). A CM-path
is a CC-path such that its second causal component is a single message. Such a path is of the form
4 Though expressed differently, this definition (based on the causal doubling notion) is equivalent to that of Wang.
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FIG. 3. Causal components of a Z-path.
„ † [m]. When considering different restrictions that can be applied to the first (causal) component „
of a CM-path „ † [m], we obtain particular classes of CM-paths. More precisely:
S means that „ is simple; i.e., if „ D [m1;m2; : : : ;mk] then 8‘ (1 • ‘ • k ¡ 1) the events
deliver(m‘) and send(m‘C1) belong to the same checkpoint interval. In other words, „ does not include
local checkpoints.
P means that „ is prime; i.e., if „ is from I j;y to Ii;x , „ is the first C-path starting from I j;y and
arriving in Ii;x . In other words, „ is the first causal path revealing the local checkpoint C j;y¡1 to Pi
(whose current interval is Ii;x ).
E means that „ is elementary, i.e., the sequence of processes traversed by „ has no repetition.
The meaning of successive embeddings, SCM-paths, PSCM-paths, and EPSCM-paths, follows im-
mediately. (Formal definitions will be provided in Section 3.3).
Note that the concepts of simple, prime, and elementary define independent properties and are
meaningful only in the context of CM-paths. The order in which they are embedded (as depicted
in Fig. 2) is not significant and is used only to obtain an elegant proof of Theorem 4.1.
3.2. The Notion of Visibility
Properties CM, SCM, PSCM, and EPSCM are visible in the sense that they can be tested online upon
the arrival of a message. In fact, each of these properties involves information that is entirely contained
in the causal past of each arrival event. Such information can be encoded in the local context of the
receiving process and in the message itself. Let m 0 be an arriving message. Then, for example, CM
is equivalent to “a message m has been sent previously in the same checkpoint interval.” Simple can
be tested if m 0 carries the sequences of checkpoints that are included in the C-paths terminated by m 0.
Prime can be tested by using dependency vectors [19]. Elementary can be tested by including in m 0 the
sequences of processes that have been traversed by the C-paths terminated by this m 0. Let us note that,
practically, some of these properties can be more efficiently tested using appropriate data structures (see
Section 6).
3.3. Embedded Visible RDT-Compliant Properties
3.3.1. CC-paths
As previously defined, a CC-path is a Z-path composed of exactly two C-paths. In the checkpoint and
communication pattern shown in Fig. 1, [m2;m5;m4;m8] is a CC-path: it is composed of the C-paths
[m2;m5] and [m4;m8]. Its backward-interval is the interval I j;2.
Notation. For the class formed by CC-paths, we introduce a specific notation: when ‡ D „1 †„2
with j„1j D ‘1 and j„2j D ‘2 we say that ‡ is a (‘1; ‘2)-Z-path.
The basic idea behind CC-paths lies in the following result.
LEMMA 3.1. If all CC-paths are doubled, then all Z-paths are doubled.
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FIG. 4. Proof of Lemma 3.1.
Proof. Let doubled(‘) denote the predicate: “all Z-paths of order ‘ are doubled.” The lemma can
be formulated as doubled(2) ) 8‘ ‚ 2 : doubled(‘). Thus, it is sufficient to prove by induction:
8‘ ‚ 2 : doubled(‘)) doubled(‘C 1).
Let ‡ D „1 †„2 ¢ ¢ ¢„‘ †„‘C1 be a Z-path of order ‘C 1 from Ii;x to I j;y (Fig. 4). ‡ 0 D „1 †„2 ¢ ¢ ¢„‘
is a Z-path of order ‘ from Ii;x (to some Ik;z). From the induction assumption, ‡ 0 is doubled. Thus, there
exists a C-path ” from Ii;x 0 to Ik;z0 with x • x 0 and z0 • z. Since „‘C1 is a C-path from Ik;z to I j;y ,
we have that ” fl „‘C1 is a C-path or a CC-path, from Ii;x 0 to I j;y . In the former case, ‡ is doubled by
” –„‘C1; in the latter case, from the lemma assumption, this Z-path is doubled and thus there exists a
C-path „ from Ii;x 00 to I j;y0 with x 0 • x 00 and y0 • y. Thus, x • x 00 and y0 • y, which shows that ‡ is
doubled by „.
3.3.2. CM-paths
A CC-path „1 †„2, composed of a C-path „1 and of a single message „2 D [m] is called a CM-path.
More precisely:
DEFINITION 3.2. A CM-path is a (C; 1)-Z-path (C stands for any strictly positive integer value).
The basic idea behind CM-paths lies in the following result.
LEMMA 3.2. If all CM-paths are doubled, then all CC-paths are doubled.
Proof. Let doubled(‘) denote the predicate “all (C; ‘)-CC-paths are doubled.” The lemma can be
formulated as doubled(1) ) 8‘ ‚ 1 : doubled(‘). Thus it is sufficient to prove, inductively: 8‘ ‚ 1 :
doubled(‘)) doubled(‘C 1).
Let ‡ D „1 †„2 with j„2 jD ‘C 1 a (C; ‘C 1)-Z-path of order two from Ii;x to I j;y (Fig. 5). Let m
be the first message of „2, going from Ik;z to Ip;t . We have „2 D [m] –„02 where „02 is a C-path from
Ip;t 0 to I j;y , with t • t 0 and j„02j D ‘; „1 † [m] is a CM-path from Ii;x to Ip;t . By the lemma assumption,
FIG. 5. Proof of Lemma 3.2.
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there exists a C-path ” from Ii;x 0 to Ip;t 00 with x • x 0 and t 00 • t . The path ” fl „02 from Ii;x 0 to I j;y is
either a C-path (and since x • x 0 it is a causal doubling of ‡ ) or a (C; ‘)-CC-path (this case is shown
in Fig. 5, where t D t 0 D t 00 must hold) and thus there exists a C-path „0 from Ii;x 00 to I j;y0 with x 0 • x 00
and y0 • y; thus, x • x 00 and ‡ is doubled by „0.
3.3.3. Simple C-paths and SCM-paths
This section considers the subset of CM-paths composed of CM-paths „ † [m] such that „ is simple.
The basic idea behind SCM-paths lies in the fact that if every SCM-path is doubled then every CM-path
is doubled, as shown by the next lemma.
DEFINITION 3.3. A C-path „ D [m1;m2; : : : ;mq ] is simple if, for each i (1 • i • q ¡ 1), the two
events deliver(mi ) and send(miC1) occur (in this order) in the same interval.
In other words, a simple C-path does not “include” local checkpoints. Note that a nonsimple C-path can
be written as„ D „1 –„2 – ¢ ¢ ¢ –„‘, where each component„i is simple and there is a local checkpoint
between the events deliver(„i :last) and send(„iC1:first). In the checkpoint and communication pattern
shown in Fig. 1 the nonsimple C-path [m5;m6;m8] is composed of the two simple C-paths [m5;m6]
and [m8].
Note that a simple C-path can stop being simple only by the adjunction of an additional
checkpoint.
DEFINITION 3.4. A SCM-path is a CM-path „ † [m] where „ is simple.
LEMMA 3.3. If all SCM-paths are doubled, then all CM-paths are doubled.
Proof. Let doubled(‘) denote the predicate “all CM-paths „ † [m], where „ is a C-path com-
posed of ‘ simple C-paths, are doubled.” The lemma can be formulated as doubled(1) ) 8‘ ‚ 1 :
doubled(‘). Thus it is sufficient to prove inductively: 8‘ ‚ 1 : doubled(‘) ) doubled(‘ C 1). Let
„‘C1 –„‘ – ¢ ¢ ¢ –„1 † [m] be a CM-path from Ii;x to I j;y (Fig. 6). By construction, „‘C1 –„‘ – ¢ ¢ ¢ –„1
is a C-path and each „i (1 • i • ‘ C 1) is simple. Suppose that „‘C1 is from Ii;x to Ik;z . Thus,
„‘ – ¢ ¢ ¢ –„1 † [m] is a CM-path (whose causal part is composed of ‘ simple C-paths) from Ik;z0 to
I j;y , with z < z0. By the induction assumption, this CM-path is doubled; thus, there exists a C-
path „0, from Ik;z00 to I j;y0 , with z0 • z00 and y0 • y. Since z < z00, we have deliver(„‘C1:last) l!
send(„0:first) and thus „‘C1 –„0 is a C-path from Ii;x to I j;y0 , with y0 • y. This shows that the CM-path
„‘C1 –„‘ – ¢ ¢ ¢ –„1 † [m] is doubled.
3.3.4. Prime C-paths and PSCM-paths
This section introduces the notion of Prime C-paths and the set of PSCM-paths comprising SCM-
paths „ † [m] such that „ is prime. The basic idea behind PSCM-paths is shown in the next lemma,
which states that, if every PSCM-path is doubled then every SCM-path is doubled.
DEFINITION 3.5. A C-path from I j;y to Ii;x is prime if there exists no C-path „0 from I j;y0 to Ii;x ,
with y • y0, such that deliver(„0:last) l! deliver(„:last).
FIG. 6. Proof of Lemma 3.3.
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FIG. 7. Proof of Lemma 3.4.
Intuitively, a prime C-path from I j;y to Ii;x is the first one including the existence of checkpoint C j;y¡1
into the causal past of P 0i s current state. Clearly, if „ is not a prime C-path from I j;y to Ii;x , there must
exist a prime C-path „0 from I j;y00 to Ii;x , with y • y00; this is due to the fact that the number of events
occurring on Pi before deliver(„:last) is finite. The notion of a PSCM-path follows immediately.
DEFINITION 3.6. A PSCM-path is a SCM-path „ † [m] where the C-path „ is prime.
In other words, a PSCM-path is a CC-path „ † [m], where „ is a prime simple C-path.
LEMMA 3.4. If all PSCM-paths are doubled, then all SCM-paths are doubled.
Proof. Let ‡ D „ † [m] be an SCM-path with „ from I j;y to Ii;x and m from Ii;x to Ik;z .
If „ is prime, then ‡ is doubled, by the lemma assumption.
If „ is not prime, there exists a prime C-path „0 from I j;y0 to Ii;x , with y • y0. There are two cases:
(i) „0 is simple (Fig. 7a). In that case, by the lemma assumption, „0 † [m] is doubled. Thus, there
exists a C-path ” from I j;y00 to Ik;z0 , with y0 • y00 and z0 • z, and ‡ D „ † [m] is doubled by ”.
(ii) „0 is not simple (Fig. 7b). Then, „0 D „01 – ¢ ¢ ¢ –„0‘, where each „0j is simple. In particular,
„0‘ † [m] is a PSCM-path. From the lemma assumption, it is doubled by ”‘. Thus, ” D „01 – ¢ ¢ ¢ – ”‘ is
a causal doubling of ‡ D „ † [m].
3.3.5. Elementary C-paths and EPSCM-paths
This section introduces the set of EPSCM-paths comprising PSCM-paths „ † [m] such that „ is
elementary. The basic idea behind EPSCM-paths lies in the fact that if every EPSCM-path is doubled,
then every PSCM-path is doubled.
DEFINITION 3.7. A causal cycle is a C-path from a process to itself. A C-path is elementary if it does
not include any causal cycle (in other words, the sequence of processes it traverses has no repetition).
Note that, since processes do not send messages to themselves, the length of a causal cycle is ‚ 2.
Note also that the length of an elementary path is • n ¡ 1.
Every causal cycle is from an interval Ii;x to an interval Ii;x 0 , with x • x 0. When x < x 0 we will say
that the causal cycle is strict. The following reduction observation is straightforward: consider a prime
simple C-path „1 – ° –„2 from some interval I j;y to an interval Ik;z , where „1 and „2 are elementary
and ° is a nonstrict causal cycle. Then „1 –„2 is an elementary prime simple C-path, from I j;y to Ik;z
(on the contrary, if ° is strict, „1 –„2 is no longer simple).
DEFINITION 3.8. An EPSCM-path is a PSCM-path „ † [m] where „ is elementary.
In other words, an EPSCM-path is a CC-path „ † [m], where „ is a prime simple elementary C-path.
LEMMA 3.5. If all EPSCM-paths are doubled, then all PSCM-paths are doubled.
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FIG. 8. Proof of Lemma 3.5.
Proof. Let ‡ D „ † [m] be a PSCM-path, where „ is from I j;y to Ii;x and m from Ii;x to Ik;z .
If „ is elementary, then ‡ is doubled, by the lemma assumption.
If „ is not elementary, note that it cannot include a causal cycle ° from some Ii;x 0 to Ii;x (x 0 • x),
which would contradict its primality. Let „¯ be the path obtained by removing from„ all nonstrict causal
cycles. By the reduction observation and the previous remark, „¯ is a prime simple C-path from I j;y to
Ii;x . If it is elementary, then „¯ † [m] is doubled, by the lemma assumption, and thus ‡ is also doubled,
by construction.
Let us now consider the case where „¯ is not elementary. By construction, all the causal cycles
included in „¯ are strict. Let ° be the last causal cycle included in „¯. This cycle is from I‘;t 0 to I‘;t ,
with t 0 < t (strictness of ° ) where P‘ is one of the processes traversed by „¯, and ‘ 6D i (Fig. 8).
Then „¯ D „0 – ° –„00, where „0 is a prime C-path from I j;y to I‘;t 0 and „00 is a C-path from I‘;t to
Ii;x . Observe that „00 is elementary, by construction, and simple (because „¯ is simple). Moreover, it is
prime w.r.t C‘;t 0 ; otherwise there would exist a C-path ” 0 starting from P‘ after the checkpoint C‘;t 0 and
arriving at Pi before „00, and the C-path „0 – ” 0 would contradict the primality of „¯. Thus, „00 † [m] is
an EPSCM-path and, from the lemma assumption, it is doubled by a C-path ”. Since ” starts from P‘
after the checkpoint C‘;t 0 , we have that „0 – ” is a C-path that doubles „¯ † [m] and thus doubles ‡ .
4. A MINIMAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE RDT PROPERTY
In this section, two results are stated and proved:
1. If all EPSCM-paths are doubled, then all Z-paths are doubled (i.e., EPSCM is a visible and
RDT-compliant property).
2. If X is a visible and RDT-compliant property, then the set of Z-paths satisfying X cannot be a
strict subset of EPSCM-paths (i.e., the set of EPSCM-paths is minimal with respect to RDT-compliance).
In order to facilitate the reading, we first provide a short overview.
† The first theorem (namely, Theorem 4.1, EPSCM is visible RDT-compliant) is an immediate
consequence of the five lemmas proved in Section 3.
† The second theorem (namely, Theorem 4.2, Minimality of EPSCM) is intrinsically complex
and for better readability we give a sketch of the proof construction. We consider a visible and RDT-
compliant property X defined on Z-paths. It must be shown that X is not strictly stronger than EPSCM. In
a first stage, it is proved that if the existence of doubled EPSCM-paths does not imply the existence of X -
paths, then X cannot be RDT-compliant. Similarly, it is obvious (from the RDT-compliance definition)
that, if the causal doubling of all X -paths does not imply the causal doubling of all EPSCM-paths, then
X cannot be RDT-compliant. Thus, the only properties X to consider are such that:
1. The existence of a doubled EPSCM-path implies the existence of X -paths, and
2. If all X -paths are doubled, then all EPSCM-paths are doubled.
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In this context, the theorem is proved by contradiction: if X is strictly stronger than EPSCM, then X
is not RDT-compliant. This is achieved by a case analysis of checkpoint and communication patterns
where, by assumption, all X -paths are EPSCM-paths and at least one EPSCM-path is not a X -path.
Some patterns are first eliminated by impossibility. Then, in the only possible remaining pattern, X is
reduced to a property which, as shown in a preliminary lemma, is not RDT-compliant (namely, X -paths
are Z-paths of length • n ¡ 2, n being the number of processes).
4.1. A Characterization of RDT
THEOREM 4.1. A checkpoint and communication pattern satisfies the RDT property if and only if all
its EPSCM-paths are doubled.
Proof.
(i) Only if part. Trivial, since RDT implies that all Z-paths are doubled, and EPSCM-paths are
Z-paths.
(ii) If part. Suppose that all EPSCM-paths are doubled. From Lemma 3.5, all PSCM-paths are dou-
bled. From Lemma 3.4, all SCM-paths are doubled. From Lemma 3.3, all CM-paths are doubled. From
Lemma 3.2, all CC-paths are doubled. Finally, from Lemma 3.1, all Z-paths are doubled; i.e., RDT is
satisfied.
4.2. Minimality of the Characterization
In this section, we show that the characterization stated in Theorem 4.1 is minimal, in the sense that
the EPSCM property cannot be implied by any other RDT-compliant visible property.
The following lemma shows that a whole class of properties can be eliminated from RDT-compliance.
LEMMA 4.1. If the existence of nondoubled EPSCM-paths does not imply the existence of nondoubled
X-paths, then X is not RDT-compliant.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that X is RDT-compliant. From the definition of RDT-compliance,
we have that in every checkpoint and communication pattern no nondoubled X-path implies no non-
doubled Z-path and, in particular, no nondoubled EPSCM-path. This is equivalent to the existence of a
nondoubled EPSCM-path implying the existence of an X-path in every checkpoint and communication
pattern, a contradiction.
An example of such a property is Hamiltonian-EPSCM (i.e., an EPSCM-path traversing the n pro-
cesses).
If we are looking at a possible RDT-compliant property stronger than EPSCM, a common intuition
induces us to look at which further restrictions could be applied to an EPSCM pattern. The previous
lemma shows that this restriction cannot be on the identities of processes traversed by the causal
component of an EPSCM-path. Another possible restriction is on the length of the causal part. For
example, one could wonder whether a result such that if all EPSCM-paths whose causal part is of
length 2 are doubled, then all EPSCM-paths are doubled could hold. The next lemma proves that such
restrictions are not RDT-compliant.
LEMMA 4.2. The property X · (‡ is an EPSCM-path „ † [m] with j„j • n ¡ 3) (where n is the
number of processes) is not RDT-compliant.
Proof. Consider the checkpoint and communication pattern described as follows (an example with
n D 5 is depicted in Fig. 9).
† There are n processes denoted by P1; P2; : : : ; Pn (n ‚ 4).
† On each process Pi there is only one checkpoint interval Ii;1.
† On process P1, there is only one event: send(m1) to P2.
† On each process Pi with 2 • i • n¡2, the following three events occur in that order: send (m 0i )
to Pn¡1, receipt(mi¡1) from Pi¡1, send(mi ) to PiC1.
† on process Pn¡1, the following n¡1 events occur in that order: receipt(m 02) from P2, receipt(m 03)
from P3, : : :, receipt(m 0n¡2) from Pn¡2, send(m) to Pn , receipt(mn¡2) from Pn¡2.
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FIG. 9. A counterexample.
In this pattern, X -paths are:
8i : 2 • i • n ¡ 2; 8 j : 1 • j • i ¡ 1 : [m j ;m jC1; : : : ;mi¡1] † [m 0i ]:
Each of them is respectively doubled by [m j ;m jC1; : : : ;mi¡1;mi ]. So, all X -paths are doubled. Note
that 8i (2 • i • n¡ 2) the CM-path [mi ; : : : ;mn¡2] † [m] is not an X -path because of message m 0i that
makes [mi ; : : : ;mn¡2] not prime.
However, [m1;m2; : : : ;mn¡2] † [m] is an EPSCM-path, and it is not doubled. So, for every n (with
n ‚ 4) there exists a checkpoint and communication pattern where all X -paths are doubled and that
does not satisfy the RDT property.
DEFINITION 4.1. Let X and X 0 be two properties defined on Z-paths. X ) X 0 if 8( ˆH ; C ˆH), every
X -path is an X 0-path.
From this definition, we have the following monotonicity result:
LEMMA 4.3. If X ) X 0 and X is RDT-compliant, then X 0 is RDT-compliant.
Proof. Let ( ˆH ; C ˆH) be a checkpoint and communication pattern such that all X 0-paths are doubled
in ( ˆH ; C ˆH). Since X ) X 0, all X -paths are also X 0-paths, and thus all X -paths are doubled in ( ˆH ; C ˆH).
Since X is RDT-compliant, ( ˆH ; C ˆH) satisfies the RDT property. Thus X 0 is RDT-compliant.
The minimality result can now be formally stated.
THEOREM 4.2 (Minimality of visible RDT characterization). Let X be a visible property defined on
Z-paths, with X 6·EPSCM. If X is RDT-compliant, then :(X ) EPSCM).
Proof. Let us consider an EPSCM-path ‡ . Since X is a visible property, the fact that ‡ satisfies or
does not satisfy X depends only on the subpattern included in the causal part of the event deliver(„:last).
So, modifying the checkpoint and communication pattern by (adding or deleting) local checkpoints or
messages not included in the causal part of deliver(„:last) cannot modify the fact that ‡ satisfies or does
not satisfy the property X in the new pattern.
In the rest of this proof, we will denote by ¯X -EPSCM-path an EPSCM-path that does not satisfy the
property X . We will also use the following abbreviation: if ‡ D „ † [m] and ‡ 0 D „0 † [m 0], the sentence
“‡ 0 belongs to the causal part of ‡” means that deliver(„0:last) hb! deliver(„:last). The proof of the
theorem is by contradiction. Suppose that X is a visible RDT-compliant property with X 6· EPSCM
such that X ) EPSCM. So, (1) in every checkpoint and communication pattern, every X -path is an
EPSCM-path, and (2) there exists a checkpoint and communication pattern having an EPSCM-path
‡ D „ † [m] that is not an X -path (‡ does not satisfy X in ( ˆH ; C ˆH)). Let us consider such a checkpoint
and communication pattern, denoted by CCP. There are two cases.
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FIG. 10. A pattern where „ is not prime.
Case 1. ‡ is not doubled in CCP. Thus, from Lemma 4.1, there exists in CCP an X -path ‡ 0 D
„0 † [m 0]. By assumption, this X -path is an EPSCM-path. There are two possibilities for CCP.
1.1. CCP is such that :(deliver(„0:last) hb! deliver(„:last)) (the X-path ‡ 0 does not belong
to the causal part of ‡ ). The suppression of the message „0:last from CCP produces a checkpoint and
communication pattern in which ‡ 0 no longer exits and where ‡ does not satisfy X (see the first paragraph
of the proof) and remains a nondoubled EPSCM-path. Thus, whenever there exists a checkpoint and
communication pattern satisfying the assumptions of Case 1.1, there also exists a checkpoint and
communication pattern satisfying the assumptions of Case 1 and where every X -path belongs to the
causal part of any nondoubled ¯X -EPSCM-path. This situation is considered in the next subcases.
1.2. For all checkpoint and communication patterns CCP having a nondoubled ¯X -EPSCM-path
‡ D „ † [m], all X -paths ‡ 0 D „0 † [m 0] belong to the causal part of ‡ , and the two C-paths „ and „0 do
not share the same last message. Let I j;yC1 be the interval where the event send(„:first) occurs. In that
case, we have
(1):(C j;y hb! send(„0:first)) (otherwise„would not be prime, see Fig. 10).
Suppose that send(„0:first) occurs on process P‘, and let e be the first event of P‘ such that C j;y hb! e
(Fig. 11). The event e is necessarily a delivery event. From (1), we have send(„0:first) l! e. Since events
are atomic, it is always possible that a send event occurs between two consecutive events. Consider the
checkpoint and communication pattern CCP1 obtained by adding a message m 00 and doubling ‡ 0, and
such that send(„0:first) l! send(m 00) l! e. By construction, we have :(C j;y hb! send(m 00)) and also
:(send(„:first) hb! send(m 00)). Thus ‡ remains a nondoubled CM-path in CCP1. This construction is
FIG. 11. Doubling ‡ 0 but not ‡ .
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FIG. 12. Iteration of Case 1.3.
valid for every X -path belonging to the causal part of ‡ . So, whenever there exists a checkpoint and
communication pattern CCP satisfying the assumptions of Case 1.2, there also exists a checkpoint and
communication pattern CCP2 having a nondoubled EPSCM-path ‡ such that no nondoubled EPSCM-
path belonging to the causal part of ‡ is an X -path. Moreover, from the assumptions of Case 1.2, all
X -paths belonging to CCP must belong to the causal part of ‡ . From this we conclude that, in CCP2, the
only possible nondoubled X -path is ‡ . Applying Lemma 4.1 to CCP2 we conclude that ‡ has become an
X -path in CCP2. But, CCP2 satisfies the assumptions of Case 1.1 where the X -path ‡ does not belong
to the causal past of any nondoubled ¯X -EPSCM-path. So, there exists a checkpoint and communication
pattern CCP3 where ‡ no longer exists, and in CCP3, none of the nondoubled EPSCM-paths is an
X -path. Since CCP3 has nondoubled EPSCM- paths but no X -path, this contradicts the conclusions of
Lemma 4.1.
The only remaining possibility is the following:
1.3. For all checkpoint and communication patterns CCP having a nondoubled ¯X -EPSCM-path
‡ D „ † [m], all X -paths ‡ 0 D „0 † [m 0] are such that „ and „0 share their last message (see Fig. 12).
† Some of these X -paths can nevertheless be such that, like in the previous case, adding
a message m 00 makes them doubled, without doubling ‡ or making „ no longer prime. The same
construction as in the previous case leads to the same contradiction.
† The previous item does not apply only for X -paths ‡ 0 such that send(„:first) hb! send
(„0:first) (this is the only configuration where it is impossible to build the message m 00 without
doubling ‡ ).
So, the property X is such that in every checkpoint and communication pattern CCP, every X -path
‡ 0 D „0 † [m 0] must share its last message with a ¯X -EPSCM-path „ † [m] and deliver(„:first) hb!
deliver(„0:first).
In the checkpoint and communication pattern CCP4 obtained by removing from CCP all the messages
included in causal parts of such X -paths but not included in„, the only remaining nondoubled EPSCM-
path is ‡ . From Lemma 4.1, CCP4 must contain an X -path.
1. If ‡ does not satisfy X in CCP4, the only possible X -paths are those whose causal part is a
strict subpath of „ and thus are of bounded length.
2. If ‡ is an X -path in CCP4, then from the case assumption it must share its last message with
a ¯X -EPSCM-path ‡ 00 D „00 † [m 00] with send(„00:first) hb! send(„:first). Iterating the previous analysis,
either we obtain the conclusion of the previous item or „00 becomes an X -path and there exists a ¯X -
EPSCM-path „(3) such that send(„(3):first hb! send(„00:first) hb! send(„:first). Since the causal part of
every event is finite, this iteration will stop after a finite number of steps, leading to the conclusion of
the previous item.
To summarize, the previous subcase analysis shows that, in Case 1, X -paths are such that their causal
part is necessarily a strict subpath of EPSCM-paths. Thus, X implies the bounded length property
considered in Lemma 4.2. From this lemma and from Lemma 4.3, X cannot be RDT-compliant.
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Case 2. The negation of Case 1 is that X is a property such that in every checkpoint and commu-
nication pattern, all EPSCM-paths that are not X -paths are necessarily doubled. Consider a checkpoint
and communication pattern having an X -path. This X -path could stop to satisfy X (while remaining
an EPSCM-path) only if it became doubled. But, as will be seen in Section 5.4, the fact of being
doubled is not a visible property. So, the property :X is not visible. This contradicts the visibility
of X .
5. A FAMILY OF RDT PROTOCOLS
This section presents a particular family (FRDT ) of checkpointing protocols that ensure the RDT prop-
erty and measures of performances for protocols of this family. Then, according to some
assumptions made about this family, the notion of causal doubling has to be toughened, introducing the
notion of visible doubling.
5.1. Checkpointing Systems
A checkpointing system is a distributed computation involving processes having the following
structure: We assume that each process consists of an application layer (AL) and a check-
pointing layer (CL), as illustrated in Fig. 13. The application layer at each process can issue
send and take-ckpt events to the CL and can accept delivery from the CL. CL can issue net-send
events to the network and ckpt event to the system and accept net-receive events from the
network.
We say that a message is sent when the corresponding send event is produced; a message is received
when the corresponding net-receive event is generated; a message is delivered when a delivery event is
produced. A checkpoint is taken when the corresponding ckpt event is generated by CL to the system
that, in turn, saves the current local state on stable storage.
It is assumed that each process takes basic checkpoints at its own pace: basic checkpoints correspond
to take-ckpt events produced by AL. Moreover, a CL can take additional checkpoints, called forced
checkpoints, as directed by a checkpointing protocol. Each time a basic or forced checkpoint is taken,
a ckpt event is generated by CL.
So, a checkpointing system involves an application producing communication events and basic
checkpoints constituting a basic checkpoint and communication pattern B, and a checkpointing pro-
tocol adding forced checkpoints to B. We will denote by ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;CP) the complete checkpoint
and communication pattern produced by a protocol (CP) on a basic checkpoint and communication
pattern B.
To summarize, with each message m from Pi to Pj are associated the following events: send(m) (on
ALi ), net send(m) (on C Li ), receipt(m) (on C L j ), deliver(m) (on AL j ). The happens-before relation
is extended by:
send(m) hb! net send(m) hb! receipt(m) hb! deliver(m):
FIG. 13. Checkpointing system.
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With each basic checkpoint Ci;x are associated the following events: take ckpt(Ci;x ) (on ALi ) and
ckpt(Ci;x ) (on C Li ), and take ckpt(Ci;x ) hb! ckpt(Ci;x ). With each forced checkpoint Ci;x is associated
the event ckpt(Ci;x ) (on C Li ).
5.2. The Class of FRDT Protocols
A checkpointing protocol (CP) belongs toFRDT (i) if for every basic checkpoint and communication
patternB; ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;CP) satisfies the RDT property, and (ii) if the following assumptions are satisfied:
H1: Usable knowledge. The usable knowledge of an event e is the knowledge of the checkpoint
and communication pattern that belongs to the e’s causal past.
H2: Online decision on the receipt of application messages. Upon the receipt of a message m,
(CP) has to decide on-the-fly (without introducing additional delays) if it takes a forced checkpoint
before delivering m to the application. This decision is based on the usable knowledge at the time of
m’s receipt.
H3: No control messages among CLs. (CP)’s decisions have to be based on the information local
at each CL and the control information piggybacked on application messages received by CL.
H4: No message meaning. (CP) cannot interpret the application message contents.
H5: No application modification. (CP) cannot modify the underlying application, e.g., by delaying
arbitrarily application messages or delaying or invalidating the action to take basic checkpoints. In
particular, the checkpointing layer cannot reorder messages and basic checkpoints:
—if m and m0 are sent by the same process,
send(m) l! send(m 0)) net send(m) l! net send(m 0).
—if m and m 0 are received by the same process,
receipt(m) l! receipt(m 0)) deliver(m) l! deliver(m 0).
—if C and C 0 are two basic checkpoints on the same process,
take ckpt(C) l! take ckpt(C 0)) ckpt(C) l! ckpt(C 0).
H6: Autonomy property. Each CL has no information about other processes (such as clock speed
and clock drift) or about the maximum message transmission delay (if any) of the network.
A protocol (CP), belonging to FRDT , is characterized by the rules upon which it bases its decision
to take a forced checkpoint before delivering each message of the application (H2). Given a message
m occurring in a basic checkpoint and communication pattern B, the restriction of ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;CP)
to the causal part of the event receipt(m) will be denoted by ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;CP;m); it comprises all the
communication events and all the local (basic or forced) checkpoints belonging to the causal part of the
event receipt(m). So, according to (H1), it is the usable knowledge of this event.
It is worth pointing out that ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;CP) is not known in advance. Actually, it is defined on-the-fly
by the application and the checkpointing protocol while they progress.
As an example, the checkpointing protocols FDAS and FDI, presented in [19], and those shown in
[12] belong to FRDT . On the contrary, coordinated checkpointing protocols [3, 7], protocols where the
action to take a forced checkpoint is triggered by a send event (e.g., the CAS and the CASBR protocols
described in [19]), protocols that use scheduling of message delivery [17], and protocols that invalidate
the action of taking basic checkpoints [9] do not belong to FRDT (although some of them ensure the
RDT property).
5.3. Measures of Performances
This section presents some measures of performances that can be associated with protocols belonging
to the FRDT family. Their relevance is discussed with respect to their ability to help compare different
protocols of the family.
Recall that a protocol (CP), belonging to FRDT , is characterized by the rules upon which it bases its
decision to direct processes to take a forced checkpoint before delivering each message of the application.
According to these rules, (CP) will direct more or less forced checkpoints. An ideal performance
measure would then be the total number # f ckpt (CP) of forced checkpoints directed by the protocol.
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The comparison criterion corresponding to this performance measure is the following: (CP1) is better
than (CP2) with respect to # f ckpt if, for every basic checkpoint and communication pattern,
# f ckpt(CP1) • # f ckpt(CP2):
However, such a comparison criterion is difficult to obtain. In fact, it can be observed, from (H1), that
the decision to take a forced checkpoint before delivering a message m to the application is based on the
usable knowledge contained in ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;CP;m). Hence, this decision is influenced by the decisions
that have been made by (CP). Consequently, this decision will in turn influence the future and this
influence is unpredictable: in particular, the number of forced checkpoints that the protocol will direct in
the future depends on the current decision, and it is impossible to know how the present decision will
influence the number of future forced checkpoints. In other words, considering two protocols (CP1)
and (CP2), as soon as these two protocols have decided differently before delivering a message, the
two checkpoint and communication patterns will differ, and the future decisions will no more be taken
in the same context. In [15], Tsai et al. proved an impossibility result, stating that there cannot be an
optimal protocol in FRDT with respect to this measure of performance.
To circumvent this obstacle, another performance measure is proposed. It is based on the usable
knowledge at the time of a decision (each time a message m is received), namely, the information
contained in ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;CP;m). This knowledge (encoded (1) in the control information piggybacked
on application messages and (2) locally in each process) is used by the protocols of the family to make
their decision. Such a decision can be expressed as
if C then take a forced checkpoint;
where C is a condition evaluated according to the current context (usable knowledge). Consider two
protocols (CP1) and (CP2) based on conditions C1 and C2, respectively. We will say that (CP1) is
better than (CP2) if, for every message m, we have C1) C2. It means that, if ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;CP1;m) D
( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;CP2;m), (CP2) will take a checkpoint whenever (CP1) decides to take one. In other words,
in the same context, (CP2) can direct processes to take more forced checkpoints than (CP1). This
criterion will be called a condition criterion. One common intuition is that if a protocol forces check-
points on a stronger condition, then it should force fewer checkpoints overall. Such a property would
allow us to correlate the performance measure # f ckpt(CP) with the condition criterion. But this in-
tuition is false, as shown in [15]. However, in the same paper, the authors have shown that this in-
tuition holds for one particular protocol, namely FDAS [19]. More precisely, FDAS will force fewer
checkpoints than protocols based on a weaker condition, but more checkpoints than protocols based
on stronger conditions. So, the condition criterion is still significant as far as the family FRDT is
considered.
We have used this criterion in [1] to compare several protocols of theFRDT family. The experimental
results show that, when considering a great number of basic checkpoint and communication patterns,
the condition criterion and the average # f ckpt criterion are strongly correlated.
Finally, a secondary performance measure is considered, namely, the size of the control information
added by (CP) to application messages; it is denoted by jctrl infj(C P). In fact, this criterion can be
used to further compare two protocols that are equivalent with respect to the condition criterion. It
then becomes interesting to find the minimal value of jctrl infj(CP) in the class of protocols based on
equivalent conditions.
5.4. Visibility of Doubling
According to Theorem 4.1, a checkpoint and communication pattern satisfying RDT may accept
EPSCM-paths provided that they are doubled. But the fact that an EPSCM-path (and, a fortiori a
PSCM-, SCM-, CM-, CC-path) is doubled is not visible in the sense that this cannot be tested online
upon the arrival of a message. As an example see the EPSCM path „ †m shown in Fig. 14a. When the
message „:last is delivered to Pi , it does not know anything about the causal doubling executed by „0.
More generally, at the time of the receipt of a message forming a Z-path, how can a process know that
the Z-path is doubled, without knowing the future of the computation?
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FIG. 14. Nonvisibility of doubling.
Note that the doubled property is sometimes visible (i.e., online detectable), as shown by Fig. 14b.
This observation motivates the introduction of visibility of doubling (only CM-paths are con-
sidered):
DEFINITION 5.1. Let ‡ be an CM-path „ † [m] in ( ˆH ; C ˆH). ‡ is visibly doubled if
† it is doubled by a C-path „0, and
† deliver(„0:last) hb! deliver(„:last).
Intuitively a causal doubling of a CM-path ‡ is visible at process Pi upon the delivery of the message
„:last, if the C-path „0, which doubles ‡ , belongs to the causal past of the event deliver(„:last). The
following proposition shows that the existence of a causal doubling of an EPSCM-path ‡ D „ † [m]
with backward-interval in Pi can be learned by Pi only through the information carried on the message
„:last.
PROPOSITION 5.1. Let ‡ be a EPSCM-path „ † [m 0] in ( ˆH ; C ˆH). ‡ is visibly doubled if and only if:
† it is doubled by a C-path „0, and
† deliver(„0:last) hb! send(„:last).
Proof.
(i) Suppose the visibly doubled EPSCM-path ‡ is from Ik;z to I j;y with its backward-interval
in Ii;x . From Definition 5.1, ‡ is doubled by a C-path „0 with send(„:first) l! send(„0:first), deliver
(„0:last) l! deliver(m 0) and deliver(„0:last) hb! deliver(„:last). Suppose that :(deliver(„0:last)
hb! send(„:last)). Then there must exist a C-path ” such that deliver(„0:last) l! send(”:first) and
deliver(”:last) l! deliver(„:last) (Fig. 15a). Thus, we have a C-path „0 – ” from Ik;z to Ii;x such that
deliver((„0 – ”):last) D deliver(”:last) l! deliver(„:last); this contradicts the fact that the C-path „
from Ik;z to Ii;x is prime.
Thus, deliver(„0) hb! send(„:last) (Fig. 15b).
(ii) Conversely, the result is obvious, since
deliver(„0:last) hb! send(„:last)) deliver(„0:last) hb! deliver(„:last):
Obviously, visibly doubled implies doubled, but the converse is not true. So, Lemmas 3.2 to 3.5 and
Theorem 4.1 can now be reformulated as sufficient conditions to ensure RDT. Consequently, we get the
following theorem:
THEOREM 5.1. If a checkpoint and communication pattern has no nonvisibly doubled EPSCM-paths
then it satisfies the RDT property.
These results are weaker than the characterization results obtained in Sections 3.3 and 4.1. But,
unlike these characterizations, they involve properties that can be tested online. They will be used in
Section 6.
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FIG. 15. Visibility of doubling.
6. A CHECKPOINTING PROTOCOL ENSURING NONVISIBLY-DOUBLED EPSCM-PATHS
This section presents a protocolP belonging to theFRDT family (the first version of this protocol was
published in [1]). This protocol achieves the RDT property by preventing the occurrence of nonvisibly-
doubled EPSCM-paths. In the following, for the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality,
we refer to a process Pi , merging actually the checkpointing protocol layer CPi with the application
layer ALi .
6.1. Tracking EPSCM-Paths
Consider the situation where a message m is received by a process Pi , in an interval Ii;x . This message
forms CM-paths „ † [m 0] with all C-paths „ such that m D „:last and all messages m 0 sent by Pi in the
interval Ii;x , before the receipt of m. Among all these CM-paths, Pi has to fix the set of pairs of processes
(k; j) such that there exists an EPSCM-path „ † [m 0] from process Pk to process Pj that includes m as
„:last.
To detect the set of processes to which Pi has sent messages in its current checkpoint interval, each
process Pi keeps an array of Booleans sent toi such that, for all j (1 • j • n), sent toi [ j] is true if and
only if Pi has sent a message to Pj since its last local checkpoint.
If 8 j : :(sent toi [ j]), then the set of CM-paths „ † [m 0] such that „:last D m is empty. If 9 j :
sent toi [ j] then Pi must find all prime elementary simple C-paths „ such that „:last D m.
6.1.1. Tracking Prime C-paths
To detect the set of processes Pk such that there exists a prime causal path „ (with m D „:last)
from Pk to Pi , each process Pi maintains a vector Di [1::n] of integers, called the transitive dependency
vector which is managed as follows:
† Di [i] is initialized to 1 and incremented each time a checkpoint is taken; Di [k] (k 6D i) is
initialized to 0.
† When Pi sends a message m, the current vector Di is piggybacked on m.
† When m is delivered to Pi , Pi updates its vector Di to be the component-wise maximum of its
current Di and the piggybacked vector m:D:
for all k from 1 to n: Di [k] is updated to max(Di [k];m:D[k]).
In this way, Di [k] records the highest checkpoint interval index z of Pk on which Pi ’s current local
state transitively depends. Hence, upon the receipt of message m, Pi learns that there is a prime C-path
from Ik;m:D[k] to Ii;Di [i] if and only if m:D[k] > Di [k].
Thus, to the knowledge of Pi at the receipt of m, the set of prime CM-paths from process Pk to
process Pj with m D „:last is given by the set of pairs (k; j) such that:
sent toi [ j] ^ (m:D[k] > Di [k]):
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6.1.2. Tracking Simple Paths
To detect the set of processes Pk such that there exists a simple C-path „ (with m D „:last) from
Pk to Pi , each process Pi maintains a vector simplei [1::n] of Booleans with the following meaning: for
all k (1 • k • n), simplei [k] is true if, to the knowledge of Pi , all C-paths from Ck;Di [k] to Ci;Di [i] are
simple. The consistency of simplei is maintained by Pi as follows:
† simplei [i] is permanently true.
† when Pi takes a local checkpoint (including the initial one), it resets all entries simplei [k] (with
k 6D i) to false.
† when Pi sends a message m, the array simplei is piggybacked on this message.
† when a message m (sent by P‘) is delivered to Pi (observe that, for each k, m:simple[k] is the
value of simple‘[k] when m has been sent):
(i) for every k such that m:D[k] > Di [k]: simplei [k] is updated to m:simple[k]:
(ii) for every k such that m:D[k] D Di [k]: simplei [k] is updated to simplei [k] ^ m:simple[k].
Thus, to the knowledge of Pi at the receipt of m, the set of PSCM-paths from process Pk to process
Pj with m D „:last is given by the set of pairs (k; j) such that:
sent toi [ j] ^ (m:D[k] > Di [k]) ^ m:simple[k]:
6.1.3. Tracking Elementary C-paths
Since there is an elementary prime simple C-path „ from Pk to Pi , with „:last D m, if and only if
there is a prime simple C-path „0 from Pk to Pi , with „0:last D m, no extra data are necessary to check
whether a C-path „ with „:last D m is elementary or not.
Thus, to the knowledge of Pi at the receipt of m, there exists a EPSCM-path „ † [m 0] from process
Pk to process Pj with „:last D m, if and only if the following condition holds:
sent toi [ j] ^ (m:D[k] > Di [k]) ^ m:simple[k]:
6.2. Breaking All Nonvisibly-Doubled EPSCM-Paths
Let us note that if Pi takes a local checkpoint before the delivery of m, it breaks all EPSCM-paths
„ † [m 0] such that„:last D m. On the contrary, if Pi does not take a local checkpoint before the delivery
of m, none of these EPSCM-paths is broken. Thus, if, to the knowledge of Pi , at least one EPSCM-path
„ † [m 0] (such that„:last D m) is not doubled, Pi must take a forced checkpoint before the delivery of m
to prevent the formation of a nonvisibly-doubled EPSCM-path. In the next two sections, we address first
the case of EPSCM-paths from Pk to Pj when kD j (EPSCM-cycles) and then the case of EPSCM-paths
from Pk to Pj when k 6D j .
6.2.1. Breaking EPSCM-cycles (k D j)
An EPSCM-cycle is an EPSCM-path from Ii;x to Ii;x 0 with x > x 0. Thus, an EPSCM-cycle cannot
be doubled. 5 Thus, EPSCM-cycles must be broken as soon as they are detected.
Such a situation occurs when, upon the receipt of a message m, a process Pi detects an EPSCM-path
„ † [m 0] („:last D m) from Pk to Pj with k D j , i.e., when the condition (9k : sent toi [k]^m ¢ D[k] >
Di [k] ^ m : simple[k]) holds. Such a path „ is from Ik;m:D[k] to Ik;z for some z. From the definition of
the happens-before relation, „ is doubled if and only if m:D[k] • z. Otherwise, „ is a EPSCM-cycle,
and cannot be doubled. So, in this situation, Pi must determine if, among the set of messages m 0 sent
to Pk since the last checkpoint and up to the receipt of m, there is one whose delivery event belongs to
Ik;z with m:D[k] > z. Two cases are considered.
5 In the checkpoint and communication pattern shown Fig. 1, [m5;m2] is an EPSCM-cycle from Ii;3 to Ii;2.
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FIG. 16. EPSCM-cycles.
1. m:D[i] < Di [i] (see Fig. 16a). This means that there is no C-path from Ii;Di [i] to Ii;Di [i],
terminated by m. In particular, all messages m 0 sent by Pi to Pk in Ii;Di [i] and before the receipt
of m satisfy :(deliver(m 0) hb! send(„:first)). From this, we conclude that deliver(m 0) 2 Ik;z with
m:D[k] • z, and „ is doubled.
2. m:D[i] D Di [i]. This means that there is at least one C-path from Ii;Di [i] to Ii;Di [i], terminated
by m. Thus, among messages m 0 sent by Pi to Pk in Ii;Di [i] and before the receipt of m, it is possible that
some of them satisfy deliver(m 0) 2 Ik;z with m:D[k] ‚ z. Thus, in that case, Pi must determine whether
m:D[k] > z. That will be the case if, and only if, there is at least one checkpoint on Pk between the
events deliver(m 0) and send(„:first). Since „ is simple, this situation occurs if, and only if, the C-path
[m 0] –„ is not simple, i.e, :m:simple[i] (see Fig. 16b).
So, if the following condition C1 holds upon the receipt of message m, Pi detects that there is an
EPSCM-cycle and breaks it by taking a forced checkpoint before delivering m:
C1 · 9(k; j) : sent toi [ j] ^ (m:D[k] > Di [k]) ^ m:simple[k]
^ ( j D k) ^ (m:D[i] D Di [i]) ^ :m:simple[i]:
6.2.2. Breaking Nonvisibly-Doubled EPSCM-paths (k 6D j)
Let Pi be a process detecting, during interval Ii;x , an EPSCM-path „ † [m 0] upon the receipt of a
message m such that „:last D m. Such a path is from Ik;m:D[k] to I j;y , where deliver(m 0) 2 I j;y . In order
to determine whether this path is visibly doubled or not, Pi has to answer the following question: “Is
there a C-path ” from Ik;z to I j;y0 , with m:D[k] • z and y0 • y and deliver(”:last) hb! send(m) (see
Fig. 15 and Proposition 5.1)”? This information concerns the existence of C-paths between intervals
throughout the set of intervals. It is managed as follows:
Each process Pi keeps a Boolean matrix causali such that, for all (k; j) (1 • k; j • n), causali [k; j]
is true if and only if, to the knowledge of Pi , there is a C-path from Ik;z to I j;y with Di [k] • z and
y • Di [y].
causal
† i is initialized to false and each time Pi takes a local checkpoint, all the entries causali [i; j]
are reset to false.
† When Pi sends a message m, the matrix causali is piggybacked on m.
† When a message m, sent by Ps , is delivered to Pi , causali is updated as follows:
1. for each k such that m:D[k] > Di [k]: for every ‘, causali [k; ‘] is updated to m:causal[k; ‘].
In fact, Pi must reset its knowledge about C-paths issued from the new checkpoint interval Ik;m:D[k].
2. for each k such that m:D[k] D Di [k]: for every ‘, causali [k; ‘] is updated to causali [k; ‘]_
m:causal[k; ‘]. In fact, Pi adds to its current knowledge C-paths issued from the checkpoint interval
Ik;Di [k] that it was not yet aware of.
Then (in both cases) causali [s; i] is updated to true, and for every ‘, causali [‘; i] is updated to
causali [‘; i] _ causali [‘; j] (transitive closure).
With this setting, the condition m:causal[k; j], evaluated by Pi upon the receipt of m, is true if and
only if the EPSCM-path „ † [m 0] (with „:last D m) from Pk to Pj is visibly doubled or if there exists
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an EPSCM-cycle from Pj to Pj which cannot be doubled. In fact, if m is sent by process P‘, the value
of m:causal[k; j] is the value of causal‘[k; j] at the time m is sent. By construction, this value is true
if and only if there exists a C-path ” from Ik;z to I j;y0 with D‘[k] • z and y0 • D‘[ j], i.e., m:D[k] • z
and y0 • m:D[ j], and a C-path ” 0 from I j;y00 to I‘;t with y00 ‚ y0 and deliver(” 0:last) occurs before
send(m). Thus, m:D[ j] ‚ y00. Moreover, if y denotes the index of interval where m 0 is delivered, then
either y0 • y or there is a EPSCM-cycle from Pj to Pj . Suppose y0 > y. This implies m:D[ j] > y
which, together with sent toi [ j], implies the existence of an EPSCM-cycle from Pj to Pj .
The previous discussion shows that, when a message m is received by Pi , the following condition
must be evaluated:
C2 · 9(k; j) : (m:D[k] > Di [k]) ^ sent toi [ j] ^ m:simple[k] ^ (k 6D j) ^ (:m:causal[k; j]):
This condition means that, to the knowledge of Pi , there exists at least one EPSCM-path from Pk to
Pj which is nonvisibly doubled. If it is evaluated to true, then the protocol forces Pi to take a local
checkpoint before delivering m.
6.2.3. Summary
The two previous sections showed that, when a message m is received by Pi , this process has to
take a forced local checkpoint before delivering m if and only if one of the two conditions C1 or C2 is
evaluated to true. This is summarized by the following condition C · (C1 _ C2):
C · 9(k; j) : (m:D[k] > Di [k]) ^ sent toi [ j] ^ m:simple[k]
^ (((k 6D j) ^ :m:causal[k; j]) _
((k D j) ^ (m:D[i] D Di [i]) ^ :m:simple[i])
)
6.3. Formal Description of the Checkpointing Protocol
Each process Pi is endowed with the following arrays whose semantics has been defined in previous
sections.
Di : array[1::n] of integer;
simplei ; sent toi : array[1::n] of Boolean;
causali : array[1::n; 1::n] of Boolean;
The protocol is formally described in Fig. 17. It is composed of statements performed by a process
Pi at initialization (S0), when it sends a message (S1), when a message is received (S2), and when a
checkpoint (basic or forced) has to be taken (S3). A forced checkpoint is taken when the predicate C is
true.
Though theoretically the size of the control information piggybacked on application messages is
given by one vector of integers (D), one square matrix of Booleans (causal), and one vector of Booleans
(simple), we would like to note that, practically, the vector simple can be encoded in the diagonal of
the matrix causal as that diagonal is never used by the condition C. In this way, the size of the control
information reduces to one vector of integers and a square matrix of Booleans.
6.4. Performance Issues
In this section, we show that the condition C used by the protocol P presented in the previous section
is such that no protocol of theFRDT family can be based on a strictly stronger condition. Then we show
that the size of the control information used by P is minimal with respect to the condition C, i.e., for
every protocol of the FRDT family based on condition C, at least n integers and n2 Booleans must be
piggybacked on each application message.
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FIG. 17. The checkpointing protocol.
6.4.1. The Condition
Upon the receipt of a message m, the condition C used by P is evaluated to true if and only if
there exists an EPSCM-path „ † [m 0] with m D „:last that is not visibly doubled in ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;P;m).
Suppose that there exists a protocol CP in the FRDT family, based on a strictly stronger condition C 0,
i.e., C 0 ) C and:(C ) C 0). This means that there exists a basic checkpoint and communication pattern
B and a message m occurring in B such that:
1. ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;P;m) D ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;CP;m) (in the causal past of the event receipt(m), the two
protocolsP and CP have taken the same decisions, i.e., the two conditions C and C0 have been evaluated
to the same value), and
2. upon the receipt of m, C 0 is evaluated to false whereas C is evaluated to true.
Since C is evaluated to true, there is an EPSCM-path„ † [m 0] with m D „:last that is not visibly doubled
in ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;P;m). Thus, this path is not visibly doubled in ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;CP;m). Since C 0 is evaluated
to false, the checkpoint and communication pattern ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;CP) includes a nonvisibly-doubled Z-
path. According to its usable knowledge the protocol CP cannot assert that this EPSCM-path is doubled.
Thus, CP violates assumption (H2) and does not belong to FRDT , a contradiction.
6.4.2. Size of Data Structure
Every protocol CP of the FRDT family, based on the condition C, must be able, upon the receipt of a
message m, to detect:
1. EPSCM-paths „ † [m 0] with m D „:last.
2. whether each of these paths is visibly doubled or not.
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Let Pi be the process where m is received. To perform these tasks, Pi uses the usable knowledge at
the event receipt(m), ( ˆH ; C ˆH)(B;CP;m), encoded in its local context and in the control information of
message m. The latter information is the most up-to-date usable knowledge, and the comparison with
the former information can be used to test whether the information encoded in m updates Pi ’s local
context. Let K(m) denote the set of processes defined in the following way: Pj 2 K(m) if and only
if there is a C-path starting from some interval of Pj and ending with m. If Pj 2 K(m), let last(m; j)
denote the greatest interval index of Pj such that there is a C-path starting from I j;last(m; j) and ending
with m. Note that, if Pj 62 K(m), then last(m; j) D 1 (each process has an initial interval with index 1).
† Detecting prime C-paths „ such that m D „:last requires one to compare, for every j 6D i , the
index last(m; j) with the greatest Pj ’s interval index currently stored in Pi ’s local context. To this end,
the (n ¡ 1) integer values last(m; j); j 6D i must be contained in the message m.
† Detecting simple C-paths „ such that m D „:last requires one to test whether, for each j such
that Pj 2 K(m) there is a C-path from I j;last(m; j) ending with m, including no local checkpoint. Since
this knowledge is associated by the Boolean operation “and” along C-paths (i.e., „ D „1 –„:last is
simple if and only if„1 is simple “and” there is no local checkpoint between the events deliver(„1:last)
and send(„:last)), the message m must contain one Boolean value per process Pj ; j 6D i , i.e., (n ¡ 1)
Boolean values.
† As already pointed out, detecting elementary C-paths requires no additional information.
† Detecting whether an EPSCM-path from an interval Ik;z to an interval I j;y is visibly doubled
requires one to know for which pairs (k; j) there is a C-path from some relevant interval of Pk to some
relevant interval of Pj (their indexes depend on the values last(m; k) and last(m; j) respectively), and
this knowledge belongs to the casual past of receipt(m). Since, by definition, the value for the pair
(k; j); k D j is irrelevant, the message m must include one Boolean value for each pair (k; j); k 6D j ,
i.e., n(n ¡ 1) Boolean values.
† Detecting whether m “completes” an EPSCM-cycle from Pi to itself requires one to know
whether m ends a nonsimple C-path from the current interval of Pi . Thus, the message m must include
the integer value last(m; i) and a Boolean value indicating whether there is a nonsimple C-path from
Pi to itself.
Putting these requirements together, we obtain that m must include (n ¡ 1)C 1 D n integer values,
and n ¡ 1 C n(n ¡ 1) C 1 D n2 Boolean values. Since this is exactly the size of control information
added by the protocol P to the application messages, this protocol is optimal with respect to the size of
control information.
6.5. Comparison with Other Protocols of the FRDT Family
Several variants of P can be obtained by weakening the predicate C, i.e., by replacing C by a weaker
predicate C 0 (thus C ) C 0) in the test performed upon the arrival of a message m to decide whether a
forced checkpoint must be taken. According to the discussion of Section 5.3, weakening the predicate
C leads to variants that are not better than P with respect to their conditions. However, weakening
of condition C allows the size of the control information piggybacked on application messages to be
decreased, and thus these variants show a trade-off between the size of the control information and
the strength of the condition under which a protocol directs processes to take forced checkpoints: the
better is the protocol with respect to its condition, the bigger is the control information piggybacked on
application messages.
Before examining some of these variants, let us remark that, since by construction,
8k : m:causal[k; k] D false, the predicate C can be rewritten as:
C · 9(k; j) : (m:D[k] > Di [k]) ^ sent toi [ j] ^ m:simple[k] ^ :m:causal[k; j]
^ (((k 6D j) _
((k D j) ^ (m:D[i] D Di [i]) ^ (:m:simple[i]))
)
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i.e., in a more concise way:
C · 9(k; j) : (m:D[k] > Di [k]) ^ sent toi [ j] ^ m:simple[k] ^ :m:causal[k; j]
^ ((k D j)) ((m:D[i] D Di [i]) ^ :m:simple[i]))
No-EPSCM-Cycle( j D k). If (k D j) ) ((m:D[i] D Di [i]) ^ :m:simple[i]) is evaluated to true
by default, the predicate C is weakened to:
C:EPSCM( jDk) · 9(k; j) : (m:D[k] > Di [k]) ^ sent toi [ j] ^ m:simple[k]
^ (:m:causal[k; j])
The corresponding protocol breaks all nonvisibly-doubled EPSCM-paths and all EPSCM-paths from a
process to itself (cycle) whether doubled or not (it supposes that all such cycles are nonsimple).
No-EPSCM-Path( j 6D k). If matrices causal are omitted, i.e., evaluated to false by default, the
predicate C is weakened to:
C:EPSCM( j 6Dk) · 9(k; j) : (m:D[k] > Di [k]) ^ sent toi [ j] ^ m:simple[k]
^ ((k D j)) ((m:D[i] D Di [i]) ^ :m:simple[i]))
In such a case we obtain a protocol that does not allow the existence of any EPSCM-path in which ( j 6D k),
whether it is doubled or not, as well as all the EPSCM-cycles in the checkpoint and communication
pattern. Each application message piggybacks one vector of integers and one vector of Booleans.
No-EPSCM. By avoiding the presence of any EPSCM-path or cycle in a checkpoint and commu-
nication pattern, we obtain the following predicate:
C:EPSCM · 9(k; j) : (m:D[k] > Di [k]) ^ sent toi [ j] ^ m:simple[k]:
Each application message piggybacks the transitive dependency vector D plus the Boolean vector simple.
Concerning the condition criterion, we have C:EPSCM( jDk) ) C:EPSCM and C:EPSCM( j 6Dk) ) C:EPSCM.
No-EPCM-Cycle( j D k) By removing the Boolean vector simple from C:EPSCM( jDk), we get the
following predicate:
C:EPCM( jDk) · 9(k; j) : (m:D[k] > Di [k]) ^ sent toi [ j] ^ (:m:causal[k; j])
In such a case we obtain a protocol that does not allow the existence of any EPCM-cycle, whether simple
or not, doubled or not. Each application message piggybacks only the transitive dependency vector D
and the matrix causal. Regarding the condition criterion C:EPCM( jDk) is weaker than C:EPSCM( jDk).
No-EPCM-Path( j 6D k). By removing the Boolean vector simple from C:EPSCM( j 6Dk) we get the
following predicate:
C:EPCM( j 6Dk) · 9(k; j) : (m:D[k] > Di [k]) ^ sent toi [ j]
^ ((k D j)) ((m:D[i] D Di [i])
In such a case we obtain a protocol that does not allow the existence of any EPCM-path from Pk to
Pj with j 6D k, whether simple or not, whether doubled or not. Each application message piggybacks
only the transitive dependency vector D. As far as the condition criterion is concerned, C:EPCM( j 6Dk) is
weaker than C:EPSCM( j 6Dk).
No-EPCM. By removing the Boolean vector simple from C:EPSCM we get the following predicate:
C:EPCM · 9(k; j) : (m:D[k] > Di [k]) ^ sent toi [ j]
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In such a case we obtain a protocol that does not allow the existence of any EPCM-path or cycle,
whether simple or not, whether doubled or not. Each application message piggybacks D as control
information. We note that in this case the vector send-to might be replaced by a simple Boolean flag
after first send. By doing so we exactly get the Fixed-Dependency-After-Send (FDAS) checkpointing
protocol proposed by Wang in [19]. It is clear that C:EPCM is weaker than C:EPCM( jDk), C:EPCM( j 6Dk) and
C:EPSCM.
Only-Causal-Paths. Another variant can be obtained by avoiding the presence of any Z-path (see
Section 2.3.1) by preventing the formation of any backward interval (i.e., a send-delivery sequence in
a checkpoint interval). This can be done by using the following predicate:
C:NCP · 9 j : (sent toi [ j]); :
In such a case each time a message is received by a process Pi after a send event a forced checkpoint is
taken in order to break the sequence. This protocol is purely “syntactic” in the sense that it does not use
control information piggybacked on application messages. Also in this case the vector sent to might
be replaced by a simple Boolean flag after first send. These simplifications produce Russell’s protocol
[12]. It is clear that C:NCP is weaker than C:EPCM.
No-Causal-Dependency. If we take a checkpoint each time we receive a dependency vector D that
brings at least one piece of new information about another process, we actually avoid the occurrence
of any causal dependency between the newly-learned checkpoint interval and the current checkpoint
FIG. 18. A family of protocols satisfying RDT.
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interval. This is done by using the following predicate:
C:CD · 9k : (m:D[k] > Di [k])
This protocol piggybacks a dependency vector D on each application message as control information.
This protocol corresponds actually to the one presented in [16] that was named Fixed-Dependency-
Interval (FDI) by Wang in [19]. Clearly, C:CD is weaker than C:EPCM.
Only-One-Delivery. If a forced checkpoint is taken each time a message is received, every check-
point interval contains at most one delivery event. This corresponds to the ultimate weakening of C to
the tautology. Of course, the tautology is the weakest of all predicates and thus this protocol is the least
efficient in terms of the number of forced checkpoints. Recall that when considering each nondetermin-
istic event logged, processes adopting this protocol follow a PWD behavior. So, as pointed out in the
Introduction, PWD can be seen as a very particular case of RDT.
Figure 18 summarizes the discussion of Section 6.5. In that figure, a plain arrow from (CP1) to (CP2)
indicates that (CP1) is better than (CP2) with respect to the condition criterion and a dotted arrow
indicates that jctrl infj(C P1) • jctrl infj(C P2). The rectangle depicted in the bottom of the figure
encloses the part of the FRDT hierarchy comprising the protocols belonging to the FDAS family, as
identified in [19]. This figure completes (by introducing the condition criterion) the figure proposed by
Tsai et al. [15]. According to their formally proved results, when considering the # f ckpt(CP) criterion,
all the protocols located above No-EPCM (alias FDAS) are better than FDAS whereas FDAS is better
than all those located under No-EPCM.
7. CONCLUSION
Considering a checkpoint and communication pattern, the RDT property (introduced by Wang [19])
stipulates that there is no hidden dependency between local checkpoints. In other words, if there is a
dependency between two checkpoints due to a Z-path (non causal message chain), then there exists a
C-path (causal message chain) that “doubles” the non causal one and that establishes the same depen-
dency. This paper has introduced the concept of RDT-compliance and has provided a characterization
of the RDT property. This characterization is based on a visible and RDT-compliant property on Z-paths
(EPSCM-paths), and it has been shown that it cannot be implied by any other visible RDT-compliant
property. This minimality result solves a previously open problem.
A family of communication-induced protocols, called FRDT , has been introduced. This family in-
cludes checkpointing protocols suited to the asynchronous distributed computation model that are able
to decide, on-the-fly and without delaying the underlying application, whether or not to take an ad-
ditional forced checkpoint upon the receipt of a message. A new protocol P belonging to this family
has been designed from a condition derived from the minimal characterization. The protocol P tracks
in a subtle way causal dependencies on already taken checkpoints; this tracking allows one to detect,
for each incoming message forming a Z-path with messages previously sent in the same checkpoint
interval, whether this Z-path is an EPSCM-path and, in the affirmative, whether it is doubled or not,
according to the usable knowledge. Doing so allows the occurrence of hidden dependencies, namely,
those that would be created by nonvisibly-doubled EPSCM-paths, to be prevented. This technique is
safe, since nondoubled Z-paths cannot be visibly doubled; it attains a kind of optimality in the sense
that, according to the usable knowledge, the set of Z-paths that must be broken is minimal. It is also
shown that P is optimal with respect to the size of data structures. To our knowledge, this is the first
protocol of the FRDT family that enjoys such nice features. It has also been shown that many previ-
ously known communication-induced checkpointing protocols ensuring the RDT property belong to
the FRDT family and can be derived from the protocol P . Each of these derivations corresponds to a
particular weakening of the condition used by P .
Finally, we point out that ensuring RDT in a distributed computation means allowing efficient, on-
line, and distributed implementation of algorithms for recovery line computation, garbage collection
of old checkpoints, and output commits which are the core problems to attack when adopting a
checkpointing-based rollback-recovery technique. The protocolP , based on a minimal characterization
of the RDT, allows one to achieve all these advantages with a reduced additional checkpointing overhead.
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